# Black Nihilism 1NC

#### The 1AC is premised on a politics of hope wed to the notion that society is always redeemable, always progressing, but never quite here. This politics of affirming progress-to-come naturalizes anti-black violence and rests on black flesh. Only abandoning the aff's political hope subverts this myth of progress which coheres itself through black suffering.

**Warren 15[[1]](#footnote-1)**

We find similar logic in the contemporary moment. **Renisha McBride, Jordon Davis, Kody Ingham, Amadou Diallo, Aiyana Stanley-Jones, Frederick Jermain Carter, Chavis Carter, Timothy Stansbury, Hadiya Pendleton, Oscar Grant, Sean Bell, Kendrec McDade, Trayvon Martin, and Mike Brown**, among others, **constitute a** fatal **rupture of the Political; these signifiers, stained in blood, refuse** the closure that **the Political promise**s**. They haunt political discourses of progress**, betterment, equality, citizenship, **and justice**—the metaphysical organization of social existence. We are witnessing **a shocking accumulation of** injured and **mutilated black bodies**, particularly young black bodies, which **place** what seems to be **a**n unanswerable **question mark in the political field: if we are truly progressing toward this “society-that-is-to-come (maybe),” why is black suffering increasing at such alarming rates?** In response to this inquiry, **we are told to keep struggling, keep “hope” alive, and keep the faith**. **After** George **Zimmerman was acquitted for murdering Trayvon Martin, President Obama** addressed the nation and **importuned us to keep fighting for change because “each successive generation seems to be making progress in changing attitudes** toward race” **and, if we work hard enough, we will move closer to “becoming a more perfect union.”** **Despite Martin’s corpse lingering in the minds of young people and Zimmerman’s smile of relief after the verdict, we are told that things are** actually **getting better.** Supposedly, **the generation that murdered Trayvon Martin** and Renisha McBride **is much better than the generation that murdered Emmett Till.** **Black suffering**, here, **is instrumentalized to accomplish pedagogical,** cathartic, **and redemptive objectives and, somehow, the growing number of dead black bodies in the twenty-first century is an indication of our progress toward “perfection.”** **Is perfection predicated on black death? How many more black bodies must be lynched, mutilated, burned, castrated, raped, dismembered, shot, and disabled before we achieve this “more perfect union”?** In many ways, **black suffering and death become the premiere vehicles of political perfection and social maturation**. This essay argues that **the logic of the Political—linear temporality, biopolitical futurity, perfection, betterment, and redress—sustains black suffering. Progress and perfection are worked through the pained black body and any recourse to the Political and its discourse of hope will** ultimately **reproduce** the very metaphysical **structures of violence that pulverize black being**. This piece attempts to rescue black nihilism from discursive and intellectual obliteration; rather than thinking about black nihilism as a set of pathologies in need of treatment, this essay considers black nihilism a necessary philosophical posture capable of unraveling the Political and its devastating logic of political hope. **Black nihilism resists emancipatory rhetoric that assumes it is possible to purge the Political of anti-black violence and advances political apostasy as the only “ethical” response to black suffering.[…]**Throughout this essay, I have argued that the Politics of hopepreserve metaphysical structures that sustain black suffering. This preservationamounts to an exploitation of hope—**when the Political colonizes the spiritual principle of hope and puts it in the service of extending the** “will to power” of an **anti-black organization of existence.** **The Politics of hope**, then, **is bound up with metaphysical violence [that]**, and this violence **masquerades as a “solution”** to the problem of anti-blackness. Temporal linearity, perfection, betterment, struggle, work, and utopian futurity are conceptual instruments of the Political that will never obviate black suffering or anti-black violence; these concepts only serve to reproduce the conditions that render existence unbearable for blacks. **Political theologians** and black optimists **avoid the** immediacy of **black suffering**, the horror of anti-black pulverization, **and place relief in a “not-yet-but-is (maybe)-to-come-social order”** that, itself, can do little more but admonish blacks to survive tokeep struggling. Political hope becomes a vicious and abusive cycle of struggle—it mirrors the Lacanian drive, and we encircle an object (black freedom, justice, relief, redress, equality, etc.) that is inaccessible because it doesn’t really exist. The political theologian and black optimist, then, propose a collective Jouissance as an answer to black suffering—finding the joy in struggle, the victory in toil, and the satisfaction in inefficacious action. **We continue to “struggle”** and “work” **as black youth are slaughtered** daily, **black bodies are incarcerated as forms of capital**, black infant mortality rates are soaring, **and hunger is disabling** the bodies, minds, and spirits of **desperate black youth.** In short, **these conditions are deep metaphysical problems—the sadistic pleasure of metaphysical domination—** and “work” and **“struggle” avoid the terrifying fact that the world depends on black death to sustain itself.** **Black nihilism attempts to break this “drive”—to stop it in its tracks**, as it were**—and to end the cycle of insanity that political hope perpetuates**. The question that remains is a question often put to the black nihilist: what is the point? This compulsory geometrical structuring of thought—all knowledge must submit to, and is reducible to, a point—it is an epistemic flicker of certainty, determination, and, to put it bluntly, life. “The point” exists for life; it enlivens, enables, and sustains knowledge. Thought outside of this mandatory point is illegible and useless. To write outside of the “episteme of life” and its grammar will require a position outside of this point, a position somewhere in the infinite horizon of thought (perhaps this is what Heidegger wanted to do with his reconfiguration of thought). Writing in this way is inherently subversive and refuses the geometry of thought. Nevertheless, the nihilist is forced to enunciate his refusal through a “point,” a point that is contradictory and paradoxical all at once. To say that the point of this essay is that “the point” is fraudulent—its promise of clarity and life are inadequate— will not satisfy the hunger of disciplining the nihilist and insisting that one undermine the very ground upon which one stands. Black nihilistic hermeneutics resists “the point” but is subjected to it to have one’s voice heard within the marketplace of ideas. The “point” of this essay is thatpolitical hope is pointless. **Black suffering is an essential part of the world, and placing hope in the very structure that sustains metaphysical violence, the Political, will never resolve anything.** This is why the black nihilist speaks of “exploited hope,” and **the black nihilist attempts to wrest hope from the clutches of the Political.** Can we think of hope outside the Political? Must “salvation” translate into a political grammar or a political program? The nihilist, then, hopes for the end of political hope and its metaphysical violence. **Nihilism is not antithetical to hope; it does not extinguish hope but reconfigures it.** **Hope is the foundation of the black nihilistic hermeneutic.** In “Blackness and Nothingness,” Fred Moten (2013) conceptualizes blackness as a “pathogen” to metaphysics, something that has the ability to unravel, to disable, and to destroy anti-blackness. If we read Vattimo through Moten’s brilliant analysis, we can suggest that blackness is the limit that Heidegger and Nietzsche were really after. It is a “blackened” world that will ultimately end metaphysics, but putting an end to metaphysics will also put an end to the world itself—this is the nihilism that the black nihilist must theorize through. This is a far cry from what we call “anarchy,” however. The black nihilist has as little faith in the metaphysical reorganization of society through anarchy than he does in traditional forms of political existence. **The black nihilist offers political apostasy as the spiritual practice of denouncing** metaphysical violence, black suffering, and **the idol of antiblackness. The act of renouncing will not change political structures** or offer a political program; **instead, it is the act of retrieving the spiritual concept of hope from the captivity of the Political.** Ultimately, it is impossible to end metaphysics without ending blackness, and the black nihilist will never be able to withdraw from the Political completely without a certain death-drive or being-toward-death. **This is the essence of black suffering: the lack of reprieve from metaphysics, the tormenting complicity in the reproduction of violence, and the lack of a coherent grammar to articulate these dilemmas.** After contemplating these issues for some time in my office, I decided to take a train home. As I awaited my train in the station, an older black woman asked me about the train schedule and when I would expect the next train headed toward Dupont Circle. When I told her the trains were running slowly, she began to talk about the government shutdown. “They don’t care anything about us, you know,” she said. “We elect these people into office, we vote for them, and they watch black people suffer and have no intentions of doing anything about it.” I shook my head in agreement and listened intently. “I’m going to stop voting, and supporting this process; why should I keep doing this and our people continue to suffer,” she said. I looked at her and said, “I don’t know ma’am; I just don’t understand it myself.” She then laughed and thanked me for listening to her—as if our conversation were somewhat cathartic. “You know, people think you’re crazy when you say things like this,” she said giving me a wink. “Yes they do,” I said. “But I am a free woman,” she emphasized “and I won’t go back.” Shocked, I smiled at her, and she winked at me; at that moment I realized that her wisdom and courage penetrated my mind and demanded answers. I’ve thought about this conversation for some time, and it is for this reason I had to write this essay. To the brave woman at the train station, I must say you are not crazy at all but thinking outside of metaphysical time, space, and violence. Ultimately, we must hope for the end of political hope

#### The alternative is political apostasy, the complete rejection of the “not-yet-social order” and the hope for the end of political hope.

**Warren 15[[2]](#footnote-2)**

For West and Brogdon, nihilism is a spiritual-psychic disorder that requires a spiritual antidote. In this configuration of the spiritual, the nihilist is in need of deliverance—deliverance from the bondage of “hope-death.” We might, however, think of the nihilists not as the fleshly embodiment of “hope-death” but as spiritualists invested in the deliverance of the spiritual from the clutches of the Political. The black nihilist, in this regard, is profoundly spiritual and addresses the contamination of the spiritual by its political sequelae. Unlike the political-theologian, **the nihilist does not promise redress within the structure** of the political, for this is impossible, **but offers**, instead, **rejection of the political as a spiritual practice itself.**4 In a very thought-provoking discussion published in Religious Dispatches about the murder of Trayvon Martin and George Zimmerman’s acquittal, J. Kameron Carter, Anthea Butler, and Willie James Jennings conceptualize anti-blackness as a form of spiritual idolatry (Carter 2013). Evoking the seminal text Is God a White Racist? (1973), written by Dr. William R. Jones, these scholars suggest that anti-black political organization is often anchored in a racist theology—one that considers anti-blackness God’s will. Jones put the theodicy question to Black Liberation theologians and questioned this undying fealty to a liberation grounded in political reconfiguration and emancipatory rhetoric. Is God a White Racist? not only articulates the disjuncture between emancipatory “hope” and the devastating reality of black suffering but also questions the place of the Political within thisliberation theology. This theology, indeed, presupposes certain metaphysical assumptions about the Political—progress, linear time, and agency—and Jones reveals a certain paradox within liberation theology: it is grounded in the Political but lacks a strong political philosophy to justify this grounding (i.e., a philosophy that connects the theological to the Political). This becomes even more problematic because these metaphysical presumptions are themselves instruments of anti-blackness.Anti-blackness, ironically, becomes the very foundation for the purported liberation from anti-blackness in this theology. This is precisely the contradiction that Jones intimates throughout the text, and it is this entanglement that renders political liberation somewhat of a ruse. In the article “Christian Atheism: The Only Response Worth Its Salt to the Zimmerman Verdict” (2013), J. Kameron Carter perspicuously foregrounds the problem of the Zimmerman verdict as a perverse deification of antiblackness. If the shooting of Trayvon Martin was “god’s will,” as Zimmerman expressed to Sean Hannity in an interview, then this god considered black death a moral imperative, or an act of righteousness, and Zimmerman, in shooting Trayvon Martin, assumed the role of the obedient disciple. For Carter, this god is nothing more than an idol, a spiritual imposture created by modernity and its institutions: **The white, western god-man** is an idol that seeks to determine what is normal. It **is a norm by which society** governs the body politic or **regulates**, measures, evaluates, and indeed judges what is proper or improper, **what is acceptable citizenship**. It is this idol, the idol of “the American god,” that is the symbolic figure Zimmerman identified himself with and in relationship to which he judges Trayvon Martin as, in effect, religiously wanting—wanting in proper citizenship, and ultimately wanting in humanity. (3) **The “white, western-god-man”** (or the “American god”) that Carter describes bears resemblance to what Sylvia Wynter would call “Man” (2003, 322)—both are philosophical-theological apparatuses of anti-blackness, and they **function to colonize** essential **spheres of existence** (“Man” colonizes human and the “white, western-god-man” colonizes God). The “white, western-god-man” and “Man” **index a process of extreme epistemological and metaphysical violence, and this violence serves as the foundation of Western society** and its politics**.** The only response to this epistemological and metaphysical violence, according to Carter, is atheism. It is here that we hear an uncanny resonance with Ernest Bloch’s Atheism in Christianity (1971), in which “a good Christian must necessarily be a good atheist.” True Christianity necessitates a certain atheism—in fact it depends on it—to fortify the boundaries between the just/ unjust and the righteous/unrighteous. In other words, when a Christian encounters the idol of anti-blackness, she must assume an atheistic posture toward this idol to remain faithful (or as Carter would describe it to be “worth your salt”). The atheism that Carter proffers, however, is entangled in the metaphysical bind that sustains the very violence his atheism is designed to dismantle. For him, this atheism entails “social, political, and intellectual struggle... struggle in solidarity with others, the struggle to be for and with others, the struggle of the multitude, the struggle that is blackness [as] the new ecclesiology” (2013, 4). The term “struggle” here presents political metaphysics as a solution to the problem of anti-blackness—through labor, travail, and commitment one embraces progress and linearity as social goods. With this metaphysics, according to Carter, we can “struggle to get rid of these ‘Stand Your Ground’ Laws that are in place in many states besides Florida, struggle against state legislatures (such as North Carolina’s) that are enacting draconian laws of various sorts, struggle in the name of the protection of women’s agency about their own bodies—in short, struggle to imagine a new politics of belonging” (4). This **struggle contains the promise of overcoming anti-blackness to usher in a “not-yet social-order.”** Again, the trick of time is deployed to protect “struggle” from the rigorous historical analysis that would demand evidence of its efficacy. **The “not-yet-social-order,” situated in an irreproachable future** (a political prolepsis), **can only promise this overcoming against a history** and historicity **of brutal anti-black social organization.** Carter is looking for a political theology—although we’ve always had one under the guise of democratic liberalism—that will provide conditions of life by mobilizing the discourses of hope and future temporality. The problem that this theology encircles, and evades, is the failure of “social justice” and “liberation theology” to dismantle the structure of anti-black violence; this brings us full circle to the problem that Dr. William R. Jones brilliantly articulated. Are we hoping for a new strategy, something completely novel and unique, that will resolve all the problems of the Political once and for all? **If the Political itself is the “temple” of the idolatrous god—the sphere within which it is worshipped and preserved—can we discard the idol and purify the temple?** Does this theology offer a political philosophy of purification that will sustain the “progress” that struggle is purported to achieve? In short, how does one translate the spiritual principle of hope into a political program—apolitical theology? The problem of translation haunts this theology and the looking-forward stance of the political theologian cannot avoid the rupture between the spiritual and the Political. **Can we reject this racist god and, at the same time, support the political structure that affirms this idol?** Can we be “partial” atheists? This becomes a problem for Carter when he suggests that we abandon this idol but fails to critique the structure of political existence, which sustains the power of this idol. Atheism as imagined here would entail rejecting the racist-white-god, or a racist political theology, and replacing it with a just God, or an equitable political theology. Will replacing the idol with a more just God transform the Political into a life-affirming structure for blackness? Unless we advocate for a theocracy, which is not what I believe Carter would propose, we need an answer to this question of translation. The answer to this question is glaringly absent in the text, but I read this absence as an attempt to avoid the nihilistic conclusion that his argument would naturally reach. We might even suggest that one must assume a nihilistic disposition toward the Political if justice, redress, and righteousness are the aims. The problem with atheism, then, is that it relies on the Political as the sphere of redemption and hope, when the Political is part of the idolatrous structure that it seeks to dismantle. In this sense, Dr. William R. Jones becomes an aporia for Dr. Kameron Carter’s text, if we read Jones as suggesting that black theology offers no cogent political philosophy, or political program, that would successfully rid the Political of its anti-black foundation. The Political and anti-blackness are inseparable and mutually constitutive. **The utopian vision of a “not-yet-social order” that** purges anti-blackness from its core **provides a promise without relief**—its only answer to the immediacy of black suffering is to keep struggling. The logic of **struggle**, then, **perpetuates black suffering by placing relief in an unattainable future**, a future **that offers nothing more than an exploitative reproduction of its own means of existence.** Struggle, action, work, and labor are caught in a political metaphysics that depends on black-death.The black nihilist recognizes that relying on the Political and its grammar offers nothing more than a ruse of transformation and an exploited hope. Instead of atheism, the black nihilist would **embrace political apostasy**: it is **the act of abandoning** or renouncing a situation of unethicality and immorality— in this sense, **the Political itself**. **The apostate** is a figure that **“self excommunicates”** him-/**herself from a body that is contrary to its fundamental belief system.** As political apostate, **the black nihilist renounces the idol of anti-blackness but refuses to participate in the ruse of replacing one idol with another.** The Political and God—the just and true God in Carter’s analysis— are incommensurate and inimical. This is not to suggest that we can exclude God, but that any recourse to the Political results in an immorality not in alignment with Godly principles (a performative contradiction). The project to align God with the Political (political theology) will inevitably fail. If antiblackness is contrary to our beliefs, self-excommunication, in other words “black nihilism,” is the only position that seems consistent. We can think ofpolitical apostasy, then, a[i]s an active nihilismwhen an “alternative” political arrangement is impossible. **When faced with the impossibility of realizing the “not-yet-social order,” political apostasy becomes an empowered hermeneutical practice; it interprets the anti-black Political symbolic as inherently wicked and rejects it both as** critique and **spiritual practice.**

#### The political sphere creates compulsory forms of hope and delegitimates others. The alt is not giving up hope, but refusing to put hope in the political system.

**Warren 15[[3]](#footnote-3)**

**To speak of the “Politics of Hope” is to denaturalize** or demystify **a certain usage of hope.** Here I want to make **a distinction between “hope”** (the spiritual concept) **and “the politics of hope”** (political hope). The relationship between the spiritual concept of hope and its use as a political instrument is the focus of the black nihilist critique.2 Following Kant and other postmetaphysical philosophers, the critical field questions (and in some circles completely denounces) a certain spiritual predisposition to the world—that “unknowable” noumenon that limits Reason but provides the condition of possibility for its organization of the world of perception, phenomenon. The problem with the critical questioning of the spiritual is that it often appropriates spiritual concepts and then, insidiously, translates them into the “scientific” or the knowable, as a way to both capitalize on the mystic power of the spiritual and to preserve the spiritual under the guise of “enlightened understanding.” We find this deceptive translation and capitalization of spiritual substance within the sphere of the Political—that organization of social existence through political institutions, mandates, logics, and grammars—as a way to govern and discipline beings. If we think of hope as a spiritual concept—a concept that always escapes confinement within scientific discourse—then we can suggest that **hope constitutes a “spiritual currency” that we are given as an inheritance to invest in various aspects of existence**. The issue, however, is that **there is** often **a compulsory investment of this spiritual substance in the Political.** **This is the forced destination of hope—it must end up in the Political and cannot exist outside of it** (or any existence of hope “outside” the political subverts, compromises, and destroys hope itself. Like placing a fish out of water. It is as if hope only has intelligibility and efficacy within and through the Political). Put differently, **the politics of hope posits that one must have a politics to have hope;** politics is the natural habitat of hope itself. **To reject hope in a nihilistic way, then, is really to reject the politics of hope, or certain circumscribed and compulsory forms of expressing, practicing, and conceiving of hope.** In the essay “A Fidelity to Politics: Shame and the African American Vote in the 2004 Election,” Grant Farred (2006) exposes a kernel of irrationality at the center of African American political participation. Traditionally, political participation is motivated by self-interested expectancy; this political calculus assumes that political participation, particularly voting, is an investment with an assurance of a return or political dividend. **The structure of the Political—the circular movement between self-interest, action, and reward— is sustained through** what Farred calls **the “electoral unconscious.”** **It “historicizes the subject in relation to the political in that it determines the horizon of what is possible it maps, through its delimitation or its (relative) lack of limits, what the constituency and its members imagine they can, or, would like to expect from the political”** (217). In this way, the electoral unconscious, as the realm of political fantasy, mirrors the Lacanian notion of fantasy; **it maps the coordinates of the political subject and teaches it how exactly to desire the Political**. For Farred, there is a peculiar logic (“another scene”) operating as the motivation for African American participation in the Political. Unlike the traditional political calculus, where action and reward determine civic engagement, **African American participation does not follow this rational calculus—because if it did, there would actually be no rational reason for African Americans to vote, given the historicity of voting as an ineffective practice in gaining tangible “objects” for achieving redress, equality, and political subjectivity**. **African Americans**, according to Farred, **have an** “**irrational fidelity” to a practice that, historically, has yielded no concrete transformations of antiblackness**. This group is governed not by the “electoral unconscious” but by the “historical conscious,” which is the “intense [and incessant] understanding of how the franchise has been achieved, of its precarious preciseness as well as their (growing) contemporary liminality, their status as marginalized political subjects” (217). **African Americans are a faithful voting block** not because of voting’s political efficaciousness but **as a way to contend with a painful (and shame-full) history of exclusion and disenfranchisement. Political participation becomes an act of historical commemoration and obligation; one votes because someone bled and died for the opportunity to participate, and “duty” and “indebtedness” motivate this partial political subject.** Within this piece, we get a sense that black fidelity to the Political is tantamount to the Lacanian notion of drive—one perpetuates a system designed to annihilate—participation, then, follows another logic. The act of voting, according to Farred, is legitimate in and of itself; it is a means as an end (or a means without an end, if we follow Agamben’s logic [2000]). The means, the praxis of voting, is all there is without an end in sight. **African American political participation is an interminable cycle of reproduction, a continuous practice of reproducing the means of reproduction itself. This irrational fidelity to a means without an end gives rise to “the politics of despair”—representation forits own sake and the apotheosis of singular figures—and a politics without hope**: African American fidelity, however, takes its distance from Pauline “hope”— like faith, hope is predicated upon a complex admixture of expectations and difference. In this respect, **the African American vote is not, as in the colloquial sense, hopeful: it has not expectations of a shining city appearing upon an ever distant, ever retreating, hill in the unnamed-able future**. Fidelity represents the anti-Pauline politics in that its truth, **its only truth, resides in praxis**. (223) This brilliant analysis compels us to rethink political rationality and the value in “means”—as a structuring agent by itself. What I would like to think through, however, is **the distinction between “hope” and “despair”** and “expectations” and “object.” Whereas Farred understands political participation as an act without a political object, or recognizable outcome—without an “end,” **if we think of “end” and “object” as synonyms**—I would suggest that **the Politics of Hope reconfigures despair and expectation so that black political action pursues an impossible object**. We can describe this contradictory object as the lure of metaphysical political activity: every act brings one closer to a “not-yet-social order.” What one achieves, then, and expects is “closer.” **The political object that black participation encircles endlessly**, like the Lacanian drive and its object, **is the idea of linear proximity—we can call this “progress,”** “betterment,” or “more perfect.” **This idea of achieving the impossible allows one to disregard the historicity of anti-blackness and its continued legacy and conceive of political engagement as bringing one incrementally closer to that which does not exist—one’s impossible object**. In this way, **the Politics of hope recasts despair as possibility, struggle as triumph, and lack as propinquity.** This **impossible object is not tethered to real history, so it is unassailable and irrefutable because it is the object of political fantasy**.

**The politics of hope**, then, **constitutes** what Lauren Berlant would call “**cruel optimism**” for blacks (Berlant 2011). **It bundles** certain **promises** about redress, equality, freedom, justice, and progress into a political object **that always lies beyond reach.** **The objective of the Political is to keep blacks in a relation to this political object—in an unending pursuit of it. This pursuit, however, is detrimental because it strengthens the very anti-black system that would pulverize black being.** The pursuit of the object certainly has an “irrational” aspect to it, as Farred details, but it is not mere means without expectation; instead, it is a means that undermines the attainment of the impossible object desired. In other words, **the pursuit marks a cruel attachment to the means of subjugation and the continued widening of the gap between historical reality and fantastical ideal.** **Black nihilism** is a “demythifying” practice, in the Nietzschean vein, that **uncovers the subjugating strategies of political hope and de-idealizes its fantastical object.** Once we denude **political hope** of its axiological and ethical veneer, we see that it **operates through certain strategies: 1) positing itself as the only alternative to the problem of anti-blackness, 2) shielding this alternative from rigorous historical/philosophical critique by placing it in an unknown future, 3) delimiting the field of action to include only activity recognized and legitimated by the Political, and 4) demonizing critiques or different philosophical perspectives.** **The politics of hope** masks a particular cruelty under the auspices of “happiness” and “life.” It **terrifies with the dread of “no alternative.”** **“Life” itself needs the security of the alternative, and, through this logic, life becomes untenable without it. Political hope promises to provide this alternative—a discursive and political organization beyond extant structures of violence and destruction**. **The construction of the binary “alternative/no-alternative” ensures the hegemony and dominance of political hope within the ontoexistential horizon.** The terror of the “no alternative”—the ultimate space of decay, suffering, and death—depends on two additional binaries: “problem/ solution” and “action/inaction.” According to this politics, all problems have solutions, and hope provides the accessibility and realization of these solutions. The solution establishes itself as the elimination of “the problem”; the solution, in fact, transcends the problem and realizes Hegel’s aufheben in its constant attempt to sublate the dirtiness of the “problem” with the pristine being of the solution. No problem is outside the reach of hope’s solution— every problem is connected to the kernel of its own eradication. **The politics of hope must actively refuse the possibility that the “solution” is, in fact, another problem in disguised form; the idea of a “solution” is nothing more than the repetition and disavowal of the problem itself.**

1. Calvin L. Warren "Black Nihilism and the Politics of Hope" The New Centennial Review, Volume 15, Number 1, Spring 2015, Michigan State Universit [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Calvin L. Warren "Black Nihilism and the Politics of Hope" The New Centennial Review, Volume 15, Number 1, Spring 2015, Michigan State Universit [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Calvin L. Warren "Black Nihilism and the Politics of Hope" The New Centennial Review, Volume 15, Number 1, Spring 2015, Michigan State Universit [↑](#footnote-ref-3)